Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers: The Tenth Circuit Limits Inmate Constitutional Rights by Lemmon, Erik
Denver Law Review 
Volume 84 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 8 
December 2020 
Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers: The Tenth Circuit Limits 
Inmate Constitutional Rights 
Erik Lemmon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Erik Lemmon, Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers: The Tenth Circuit Limits Inmate Constitutional Rights, 84 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 881 (2007). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
PEOPLES V. CCA DETENTION CENTERS:
THE TENTH CIRCUIT LIMITS INMATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The costs of operating state-run prison systems are becoming in-
creasingly prolific. As a result, many states have resorted to using pri-
vately-run prisons to defray the costs, a strategy that appears to be work-
ing.' Practical and moral arguments regarding the privatization of pris-
ons aside, this development has also given rise to various legal questions.
One of these questions is whether federal prisoners may bring a damages
suit against the employees of these private prisons for constitutional vio-
lations.
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics2 in which it held that federal
agents may be held liable for monetary damages for constitutional viola-
tions.3 The increasing privatization of prisons has raised the issue of
whether an analogous suit may be brought against the employees of pri-
vately-run prisons. In Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers,4 a split deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit was the first circuit court to hold that the exis-
tence of a state remedy precluded the need for a federal cause of action
and thus denied Mr. Peoples relief.5 This decision was later vacated by a
twelve judge en banc decision that split 6-6.6 Subsequently, the Fourth
Circuit, citing Peoples, also held that these claims do not state a federal
cause of action when there is an adequate state law remedy.7 However,
district courts in other circuits have held that the existence of a state law
cause of action does not preclude federal relief.8 Thus, this issue has
divided not only the Tenth Circuit judges, but also the circuits them-
I. On average, states with 20% or more privately-run prisons had an average increase in
prison costs from 1997-2001 of 24.34%. This is significantly less than the increase for states with
less than 20% privately-run prisons, 32.72%. Importantly, of the six states in the Tenth Circuit,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Oklahoma have more than 20% privately-run prisons. In Utah, a state
with less than 20% privately run prisons, the cost per diem is $125.40, whereas in Oklahoma, the
cost is $43.34. Paul Guppy, Policy Brief, Private Prisons and the Public Interest: Improving Qual-
ity and Reducing Cost through Competition, WASH. POLICY CENTER, Feb. 2003, available at
http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/ConOutPrivatization/PBGuppyPrisonsPubliclnterest.html.
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
4. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005) (2-1 decision), vacated, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006)
(en banc).
5. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108.
6. Peoples, 449 F.3d at 1099.
7. Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 2006).
8. See Vector Research Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys, 76 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir.
1996); Showengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987).
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selves and is a subject that, as stated by Circuit Judge Ebel in his dissent-
ing opinion in Peoples, "ought to be decided by the Supreme Court."9
Part I of this article discusses the background of how causes of ac-
tion against federal officers evolved from related statutory provisions.
Part II discusses the majority and dissenting opinions from Peoples v.
CCA Detention Centers. Part III discusses related decisions from other
circuits. Part IV analyzes these conflicting views and argues that the
Tenth Circuit's position on this issue is inconsistent with Bivens' under-
lying rationale. Finally, in Part V, this comment concludes that this is an
issue that will likely reoccur frequently and will thus necessitate a Su-
preme Court decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Officers in state-run prisons may be sued for constitutional viola-
tions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."° In addition, since 1949, the Supreme
Court has held that federal officers may be sued for injunctive relief for
federal violations." However, until 1971, the Supreme Court had yet to
rule whether a plaintiff could sue federal officers for constitutional viola-
tions for money damages. 12 In Bivens, the Court answered this question
in the affirmative. 13 An analysis of the question whether private prison
employees should be subject to suits for damages flowing from constitu-
tional violations requires discussion of Bivens and its progeny.
9. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108 n.2 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omis-
sion taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Thus, in order to prevail in a suit against a State under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove "that there was
state action. The reason for this is fundamental. The [F]ifth and [F]ourteenth Amendments, which.
. .guarantee due process of law, apply to the acts of state and federal governments, and not to the
acts of private parties or entities." Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration,
38 AM. U. L. REv. 531, 577 (1989). However, this potential for liability is tempered by the avail-
ability of qualified immunity. See Paul Howard Morris, The Impact of Constitutional Liability on
the Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52 VAND. L. REV. 489, 504-08 (1999).
11. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 588 (4th ed. 2003) (citing Larson v. Do-
mestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)).
12. Id.
13. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
PEOPLES V. CCA DETENTION CENTERS
A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics
Mr. Bivens alleged that federal narcotics agents entered his apart-
ment, arrested him in front of his family, and thoroughly searched his
home for drugs. 14 In addition, he was later forced to submit to a visual
strip search.' 5 He was never prosecuted. 6 Mr. Bivens brought suit in
district court, claiming the searches were in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.' 7 He sought money damages from the officers for
his humiliation and pain and suffering.' 8 The district court and Second
Circuit Court of Appeals both dismissed the case, holding that it "failed
to state a cause of action."19 Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that
"the Fourth Amendment does not provide a basis for a federal cause of
action for damages arising out of an unreasonable search and seizure.,
20
The courts concluded that Mr. Bivens' proper avenue of relief was
through a state law trespass claim.
2'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures "gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon...
unconstitutional conduct., 22 Specifically, the Court held that a constitu-
tional claim should not be confined to a state cause of action because
"the interests protected by state laws regulating ... the invasion of pri-
vacy[] and those protected by the Fourth Amendment[] ... may be in-
consistent or even hostile., 23 In addition, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protections are not "co-extensive to those found under state
law.",24  Finally, the Court concluded that even though the Fourth
Amendment does not explicitly allow for an award of money damages
for its violation, "'it is well settled that where legal rights have been in-
vaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done."'25 Thus, the Court reasoned that it may imply a constitu-
14. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971).
15. Id. Specifically, Mr. Bivens "claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental suffering." Id. at 3 89-90.
16. MICHAEL G. COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 350 (3d ed. 2001).
17. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
18. Id. at 390.
19. Id.
20. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 591 (citing Bivens. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 719 (2d. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
21. See Bivens, 409 F.2d 718, 726 (2d. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
22. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
23. Id. at 394.
24. Lumen N. Mulligan, Why Bivens Won't Die: The Legacy of Peoples v. CCA Detention
Centers, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 685, 688 (2005) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392-94).
25. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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26tional cause of action when three conditions were met. First, there
must be a federal statute granting a right to sue.2 Second, there must be
no "special factors counseling hesitation.' '28 Finally, there must be no
special congressional declaration stating that money damages may not be
awarded for constitutional violations. 29 As none of these three considera-




Since Bivens was decided, the Court has consistently refused to ex-
pand its scope. In Davis v. Passman,31 the Court faced the question of
whether a congressman's female aide, who was fired because the con-
gressman wanted a male aide, could bring a Bivens claim.32 The Court
determined that Bivens was not necessary because the Fifth Amendment
directly implied a cause of action.33
In Carlson v. Green,34 a mother sued prison officials on behalf of
her deceased son, who she claimed was the victim of a violation of the
Eighth Amendment's guarantee from cruel and unusual punishment.35
She alleged that there had been gross inadequacies at the federal prison
where he had been incarcerated.36 For the first time, the Court was faced
with a situation where an alternate federal remedy was available, in this
case under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).37 In response to the
prison's claims that the FTCA precluded the Bivens claim, the Court
referenced language in Bivens and Davis that stated that the alternative
congressional remedy must be "explicitly declared to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effec-
tive., 38 In addition, the Court held that there were four other reasons
why the Bivens claim should be allowed.39 First, the Bivens claim "in
addition to compensating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. ' '4° Second,
punitive damages were available in Bivens actions, but statutorily prohib-
ited in FTCA actions. 41 Third, jury trials are allowed in Bivens actions,





31. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
32. Davis, 442 U.S. at 230.
33. See id. at 243-44.
34. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
35. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
36. Id. at 16 n.1.
37. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 598.
38. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Davis, 442 U.S. 245-47).
39. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20-2 1.
40. Id. at 21.
41. Id. at 21-22.
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but forbidden under the FTCA.42 Finally, the FTCA claims exist only if
"the [s]tate in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a
cause of action., 43  For these reasons the Court concluded that Ms.
Green's Bivens claim stated a valid cause of action. However, Davis and
Carlson are the only two instances when the Court has allowed money
damages against federal officers for constitutional violations.44
Most of the subsequent litigation involving Bivens claims has re-
stricted the cause of action's scope.45 For example, in Bush v. Lucas,46 a
NASA employee sued under the First Amendment, claiming he had been
demoted for critical statements he had made about the agency.47 The
Supreme Court upheld the district court's ruling that a Bivens cause of
action did not exist because of "the comprehensive procedural and sub-
stantive provisions giving meaningful remedies. 4a Moving away from
the "equally effective" language of Carlson, the Court held that a con-
gressionally created remedy would be sufficient to bar a Bivens claim, if
it provides a "meaningful remed[y]" . . . even if the other remedy does
not "provide complete relief for the plaintiff."49 Similarly, in Schweiker
v. Chilicky,50 the Court found the existence of merely adequate alterna-
tive congressional remedies to be dispositive. 51 In Schweiker, social se-
curity beneficiaries sued federal officers for violation of their due process
rights when they were denied their social security.52 The Court held that
"[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has
provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitu-
tional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we
have not created additional Bivens remedies. 53  Thus, both Bush and
Schweiker limited Bivens actions to circumstances in which created
remedies are inadequate. They dispensed with the notion that these
remedies must provide equal relief as those given by a Bivens cause of
action.
In addition to these restrictions, the Court also held in FDIC v.
Meyer54 that Bivens claims are not available against federal agencies.
55
A unanimous Court held that "an extension of Bivens to agencies of the
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 23.
44. Mulligan, supra note 24, at 689.
45. Id. at 689 (writing that Davis and Carlson are the only two cases where Bivens claims for
monetary damages against federal officers have been allowed.); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Male-
sko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001).
46. 42 U.S. 367 (1983).
47. Bush, 42 U.S. at 367.
48. Id. at 368.
49. Id. at 386-88.
50. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
51. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425.
52. Id. at 417-19.
53. Id. at 423.
54. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
55. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486.
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federal government is not supported by the logic of Bivens itself.,
56 Jus-
tice Thomas, writing for the majority, stated "[i]t must be remembered
that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.,
57
Similarly, in Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko,58 the
Court considered whether a federal inmate may bring a Bivens claim
against a privately run halfway house under contract with the Bureau of
Prisons.59 Mr. Malesko, who had a heart condition that entitled him to
use an elevator to get to his fifth floor room, was forced by an employee
to use the stairs.60 He suffered a heart attack.61 In its decision, the Court,
relying heavily on Meyer, held that the purpose of Bivens, is "to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations. 62
Also, the Court reasoned that because prisoners in federal institutions are
precluded from suing the Bureau of Prisons for constitutional violations,
a Bivens claim would be inappropriate.63 Finally, the Court held that the
existence of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons pre-
cluded a Bivens claim.64 However, the Court also made note that state
law tort claims were also available that are "unavailable to prisoners
housed in [g]overnment facilities.,, 65 This observation is especially sur-
prising in light of Bivens and Carlson, which stated that state tort causes
of action are insufficient to protect constitutional interests.66
Thus, while Bivens created a cause of action for damages claims
against federal officers for constitutional violations, subsequent decisions
have limited its scope. In Carlson, the Court held that only an equally
effective alternate remedy could prevent Bivens' application.67 Later, in
Bush and Schweiker, the Court held that even comparatively incomplete
remedies could bar a Bivens claim.68 Similarly, in Meyer the Court held
that Bivens claims are not available against federal agencies. 69 Finally,
in Malesko the Court concluded that the existence of alternate causes of
actions precluded Bivens from applying to suits against private organiza-
tions.70 Thus, the next logical question is whether employees of private
56. Id.
57. Id. at 485.
58. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
59. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63.
60. Id. at 64.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 70; see also Mulligan, supra note 24, at 693 (characterizing this as the "no-entity-
liability principle").
63. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72; see also Mulligan, supra note 24, at 694 (characterizing this
as the "symmetry principle").
64. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74; see also Mulligan, supra note 24, at 694 (charactering this as the
"alternative-relief principle").
65. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72-73.
66. Mulligan, supra note 24, at 694 (describing the Malesko decision as "quite exceptional
given [the Court's] rulings in Bivens and Carlson...
67. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19.
68. Bush, 42 U.S. at 368; Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425.
69. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486.
70. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74.
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organizations may be sued for constitutional violations under Bivens, a
situation addressed in Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers.7'
II. PEOPLES V. CCA DETENTION CENTERS
A. Facts
Mr. Peoples was a federal prisoner being held in a pretrial detention
center in Leavenworth, Kansas.72 The center was run by Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA), a for-profit corporation under contract
with the U.S. Marshals Service. 73 When Mr. Peoples arrived at the de-
tention center in July 2001, the Marshals Service directed CCA to hold
him at the Leavenworth facility while he awaited trial in Missouri.
CCA placed Mr. Peoples in isolation for thirteen months.75 Initially, Mr.
Peoples was segregated for administrative reasons. 76 However, the Mar-
shals Service and CCA determined that Mr. Peoples was an escape risk
and continued to keep him segregated without telling him why he was
being kept out of the general population.77 In addition, he was not al-
lowed a hearing on his segregation status for five months and did not
have access to a law library.78 He could, however, obtain legal materials
through an attorney, though he was limited to cases for which he had
exact citations.79 In addition, Mr. Peoples believed that his phone calls to
his attorneys were being monitored by CCA staff.
80
After thirteen months, Mr. Peoples was released into Pod-H of the
general population.81 Once there, he began to file several informal and
formal grievances to the CCA staff. In these complaints, he voiced his
concerns that he would be physically assaulted by the Mexican Mafia
gang, who were also in Pod-H, because of his affiliation with the Moor-
ish Science Group.82 Nonetheless, CCA did not transfer him.83 On the
morning of August 1, 2001, the Mexican Mafia assaulted Mr. Peoples. 
84
Again, he was not transferred.8 5 Later that same day, the gang attacked
71. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005).
72. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1093.
73. Id.
74. Id.






81. Id. at 1093.
82. Id.; see also Brief for Appellant at 5, Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 449 F.3d 1097
(10th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-3071).
83. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1093.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1093-94.
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86him again. This time, however, they used padlocks, chains, and full
87 1soda cans. After this attack, CCA transferred Mr. Peoples to Pod-A.88
Mr. Peoples filed suit in the District of Kansas (Peoples 1), alleging
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. 89 He sought punitive and
compensatory damages and the court construed his claim to implicate a
Bivens cause of action.90 Citing Malesko, the court held that because
"other remedies [were] available-including state negligence actions-
the Supreme Court would not extend Bivens to private employees of gov-
ernment contractors." 9' Accordingly, the court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.92
Mr. Peoples also filed a Bivens action in connection with his thir-
teen-month segregation and for his allegedly monitored phone calls
(Peoples 1/). 9 3 The district court rejected the defendants' jurisdictional
arguments.94 Instead, the court found that "because the Tenth Circuit has
not fully addressed the issue, the court will assume arguendo that a
Bivens action against individual employees is available and will examine
the sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint., 95 The judge then granted all
of the defendants' motions to dismiss. 96 Mr. Peoples appealed both rul-
ings to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.97
B. The Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, in a two-judge ruling (over a vigorous dissent
from Judge Ebel), began by addressing whether the court had proper
subject-matter jurisdiction.98 The court held that Mr. Peoples' claims
"easily [met] the basic requirements for federal-question jurisdiction"
and thus both district courts had proper subject-matter jurisdiction.99
Next, the court addressed whether a person may bring a Bivens
claim against employees of a private prison. 00 After first discussing
Bivens and its progeny, the court held that "there is no implied private
right of action for damages under Bivens against employees of a private
prison for alleged constitutional deprivations when alternative state or









95. Id. at 1094-95.
96. Id. at 1095.
97. Id. at 1094-95.
98. dat 1095.
99. Id. at 1095-96.
100. Id at 1096.
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federal causes of action for damages are available to the plaintiff."' 0 '
The court based its holding on Malesko, which held "that the purpose of
Bivens is only to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action
against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally [as in
Carlson], or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any
alternative remedy [as in Davis].'' 2
The court then anticipated the argument that Carlson should control
this case. 0 3 It distinguished between Carlson and Mr. Peoples' claim by
arguing that Carlson involved a situation where the FTCA allowed suit
against the United States, but there was no cause of action against indi-
vidual officers. 1°4 In other words, the cause of action against private
individuals was "otherwise nonexistent."'0 5 To buttress this reading of
Carlson, the court admitted that it recognized the tension between Carl-
son and Malesko, but resolved to side with the last decided case. 10 6 In
conclusion, the court held:
[A] Bivens claim should not be implied unless the plaintiff has no
other means of redress or unless he is seeking an otherwise nonexis-
tent cause of action against the individual defendant. Therefore, we
will not imply a Bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private
prison facility when we conclude that there exists an alternative cause
of action arising under either state or federal law against the individ-
ual defendant for the harm created by the constitutional depriva-
tion. 107
Accordingly, the court looked to whether Mr. Peoples could have
brought his claims in Kansas courts to determine the existence of alterna-
tive causes of action. 0 8 For Mr. Peoples' Eighth Amendment claims, the
court found that Kansas law provides that the prison guards owe a duty
to prevent "reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by fellow inmates"
and therefore Mr. Peoples could have brought a negligence action against
the individual guards. 0 9 Thus, because an alternative cause of action
existed, Mr. Peoples' Eighth Amendment Bivens claim could not be im-
plied.' 0 In addition, the court found that Mr. Peoples' Fifth Amendment
claims regarding his thirteen-month segregation and lack of access to a
law library did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and were
101. Id. at 1101.
102. Id. (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70).
103. Peoples, 422 U.S. at 1101.
104. Id. at 1102.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1103.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1104. Actually, the court first looked to Kansas precedent in deciding that this is the
proper duty owed to an inmate. Id.
110. ldat1105.
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therefore properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)."'1 As to his allegation
that his calls to his lawyer were being monitored, the court found that
"Kansas law criminally prohibits third parties from unlawfully monitor-
ing phone calls without the permission of at least one of the communi-
cants."' 12  Thus, because all of Mr. Peoples' claims could have either
been brought under Kansas law or failed to state a claim, the court denied
him relief.' 
13
C. Judge Ebel's Concurrence and Dissent
Judge Ebel agreed that the court had proper subject matter jurisdic-
tion.' 14  However, he believed that precedent, parallelism, uniformity,
and deterrence demanded a Bivens cause of action for Mr. Peoples'
claims. 11 5 First, he argued that, contrary to the majority's opinion, the
plaintiff in Carlson could have brought a state law tort claim.1 16 Specifi-
cally, he stated, "If a state tort suit brought against a federal employee is
not a meaningful substitute for a constitutional right of action, then an
identical suit brought against a private prison employee similarly should
not be a meaningful substitute for a constitutional right of action."
'1 17
Second, he argued that the majority's opinion violates Malesko's public
and private symmetry principle because a prisoner in a governmentally-
run prison may sue individuals but, according to the majority's opinion, a
prisoner in a privately-run prison may not. 18  Third, Judge Ebel criti-
cized the majority for making Bivens remedies, which are constitutional
in nature, contingent upon state laws. 119 This results in a lack of uni-
formity that the Carlson Court sought to avoid. 120 Finally, he argued that
the majority opinion undermines one of Bivens' primary goals, which is
to deter individual officers from committing constitutional violations. '
2'
111. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, coun-
terclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
112. Peoples, 422 U.S. at 1108 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4002 (West 2005); State v.
Roudybush, 686 P.2d 100, 108 (Kan. 1984)).
113. Peoples, 422 U.S. at 1108.
114. Id. (Ebel, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1108-13 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1109 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Ebel, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1110-11 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1112-13 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1112 (Ebel, J., dissenting). Specifically, the Court stated "it is obvious that the
liability of federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights should be governed by
uniform rules." Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23.
121. Peoples, 422 U.S. at 1113.
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The Tenth Circuit reviewed Mr. Peoples' claims again in an en banc
decision. 22 The twelve-judge panel split evenly on whether a "Bivens
action is available against employees of a privately-operated prison.'
' 23
Thus, because there was no majority, the court vacated the Tenth Cir-
cuit's initial decision, and affirmed the district court's holding in Peoples
11.124
III. OTHER CIRCUIT DECISIONS THAT DISCUSS THE AVAILABILITY OF A
BIVENS CLAIM AGAINST EMPLOYEES OF PRIVATE PRISONS
There is a split of authority about whether a Bivens claim may be
brought against a private individual acting under federal authority. 25
Many of these cases have dealt with whether the private authority that
employed the defendants was acting in concert with federal authority.
126
Importantly, these cases operate under the assumption that if the private
entity and its employees are operating under the color of government
authority, a Bivens action is appropriate. These cases support the idea
that private actors may be sued under Bivens if they are acting as federal
agents. In essence, these courts have looked at Mr. Peoples' claims from
a different direction.
However, only three district courts and one other circuit court have
determined whether a state law remedy precludes a Bivens claim against
an employee of a privately-operated prison. 127  The District of Rhode
Island is particularly divided. In the 2003 case Sarro v. Cornell Correc-
tions, Inc.,128 it held that a federal prisoner may bring a Bivens claim
against employee-guards of a private-prison operator.129 Specifically, the
court held that "a private party acting under color of federal law may be
liable under Bivens."' 30 In addition, the court was persuaded by the fact
that "there is no manifestation of any Congressional intent to preclude
122. Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
123. Peoples, 449 F.3d at 1099.
124. Id. The Tenth Circuit en banc decision only upheld the district court's holding from
Peoples I1 because the court in Peoples I held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction and
therefore never reached a decision on whether a suit could be brought against employees of pri-
vately-operated prisons. Id. at 1098.
125. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 610.
126. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11 at 609-10. Compare Kauffman v. Anglo-Am. Sch. of
Sofia, 28 F.3d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that school established in Bulgaria for American and
British diplomats' children was not a federal agency and therefore exempt from Bivens liability),
with Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that company's attorneys who had conducted a search with U.S. Marshalls at a competitor's
premises were "federal agents"), and Dobyns v. E-Sys., 667 F.2d 1219, 1225 (5th Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing that a government contractor whose peacekeeping mission was a "function which undoubtedly is
traditionally exclusively reserved to the state" and therefore was subject to Bivens liability) (citation
omitted). See also Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1333 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that employee of government contractor could bring Bivens claims against private defen-
dant because defendant was a "federal actor[]").
127. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1100.
128. 248 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.R.I. 2003).
129. Id. at 52
130. ld. at 58.
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courts from awarding damages to prisoners at privately-operated prisons
for violations of their constitutional rights to the same extent that dam-
ages might be awarded to prisoners in publicly-operated prisons.' 131 The
Sarro court also addressed whether the plaintiff could have brought a §
1983 action against the defendants. 132  The court held that because §
1983 requires a violation to be committed "under color of state law," the
plaintiffs state action could not be allowed because "maintaining cus-
tody of federal prisoners is neither a power 'possessed by virtue of state
law' nor one that has been 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the
state.""' 133 The court also looked to Malesko 's statement that the purpose
of Bivens was "to deter individual federal officers from committing con-
stitutional violations.'
' 34
A year and half later, in Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Detention Fa-
cility,135 a very similar claim came before another District of Rhode Is-
land judge against the same defendants. 36 This time, however, the court
held that the very same institution was a private corporation and found
Malesko dispositive.137  In the alternative, it held that "the individual
prison guards at the Wyatt Facility carry out the traditional public func-
tion, derive their authority over the Plaintiff from state and, therefore, act
under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.',13 Thus, the guards
were state actors who "had no federal authority to act." 139
In addition to the Sarro court, the District of New Jersey also held
that a federal prisoner may bring a Bivens claim against individual em-
ployees of a private company.140 In Jama v. U.S. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service,14 1 the court was persuaded by the Sarro court's rea-
soning that private-prison guards were "federal actors, performing public
functions."'142 Also, the court found the Sarro court's interpretation of
Malesko to be persuasive: "[M]aking the federal remedies available to a
prisoner at a privately-operated institution contingent upon whether there
are adequate state law remedies ...would cause the availability of a
Bivens remedy to vary according to the state in which the institution is
located, a result that Bivens, itself sought to avoid."'143  However, it
131. Id. at 61.
132. Id. at 63-64.
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 62 (citation omitted).
135. 334 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D.R.I. 2004)
136. Lacedra, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 114. The Donald Wyatt Detention Facility is run by Cornell
Corrections, Inc., the named defendant in Sarro. Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 52. The facility was a
named defendant in the Sarro case. Id.
137. 334 F. Supp. 2d at 138. However, this part of the opinion seems to make no mention of
the claims against the individual officers.
138. Id. at 142.
139. Id. at 141.
140. Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 338 (D.N.J. 2004).
141. 343 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004).
142. Jama, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
143. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 63).
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should be noted that the Jama court made specific mention of the fact
that a § 1983 action was unavailable. 144 Nonetheless, because the Jama
court adopted Sarro's reasoning, it can assumed that it was also per-
suaded by Sarro's holding that the private-prison guards are not acting
"'under color of state law.' 45
Only one other circuit court has directly addressed whether a pris-
oner may bring a damages claim against the individual guard employees
of a privately-run prison. 46 In Holly v. Scott, the Fourth Circuit ex-
pressly adopted the Peoples court's reasoning. 47 The court stated that
they agreed that "an inmate in a privately run federal correctional facility
does not require a Bivens cause of action where state law provides him
with an effective remedy.'
148
IV. ANALYSIS
The debate about whether a prisoner is able to bring a Bivens claim
for damages against officers in privately run prisons is only likely to in-
tensify. In 2001, 12.3% of all federal prisoners were incarcerated in pri-
vately run prisons, and that number is likely to increase.' 49 As more and
more prisoners are incarcerated in private prisons, the instances of pris-
oner constitutional violation claims will also increase. Thus, this will be
an issue that is likely to pervade our courts for the foreseeable future and
ultimately must be resolved by the Supreme Court. The question, then,
is how the Supreme Court should decide these claims. Should it side
with the Tenth Circuit, and hold that the existence of a state law cause of
action precludes a Bivens claim for damages? Or should it side with the
Sarro court and Judge Ebel, and find that Bivens actions should be al-
lowed in spite of the existence of a state law cause of action?
When Bivens and its progeny are viewed in their entirety and in
light of their rationale, it is clear that the Supreme Court must rule in
favor of allowing Bivens claims for damages against officers in privately-
run prisons. First, the existence of state law causes of action do not pro-
vide the same remedies that federal causes of action for constitutional
causes of action provide. Second, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on Male-
sko was unwarranted because the Malesko Court was operating on the
assumption that claims against officers in privately-run prisons were
permissible. Third, the purpose of Bivens and its progeny, as stated in
Malesko, is to deter individual officers from committing constitutional
144. ld. at 361.
145. Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
146. Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2006).
147. Holly, 434 F.3d at 296.
148. Id.
149. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 4 (citing PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BULLETIN NCJ 195189, PRISONERS IN 2001
1(2002)).
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violations. Fourth, as demonstrated by precedent and by the prior stipu-
lation of CCA, officers in these private prisons are essentially govern-
ment actors. Fifth, not allowing Bivens claims against officers in private
prisons would have the anomalous result of allowing federal constitu-
tional claims only when the offense was committed in a federal prison or
if a privately-held prisoner brings a claim under a state cause of action.
Finally, it is unlikely that an elected body can be relied upon to protect
inmate constitutional rights and therefore it must fall to the courts.
A. State Law Causes ofAction Provide Incomplete Remedies
The existence of a state law cause of action has never been disposi-
tive in determining whether a Bivens cause of action is available. 50 In
fact, Bivens and its progeny state the opposite. For example, in Bivens,
the Court held that a federal cause of action was available "regardless of
whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would
prohibit or penalize the identical act . . " . In fact, the defendant in
Bivens argued that the existence of a state tort claim precluded the plain-
tiff from bringing a federal claim, but the Court held that state tort law
might not provide an adequate remedy. 52  In addition, in his concur-
rence, Justice Harlan stated that the availability of a federal remedy
should not depend on where the violation occurs because this idea is "in-
compatible with the presumed availability of federal equitable relief."'53
In essence, this situation will provide for "inconsistent and uncertain"
remedies for constitutional violations. 154 This concern was also present
in Carlson, where the Court allowed a Bivens claim despite the existence
of a state tort cause of action.1 55 The Court stated that the "liability of
federal agents for the violation of constitutional rights should not depend
on where the violation occurred.' ' 156 Prisoners should not have to depend
on state law to provide a remedy for the abuse of federal power.
150. See Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1109 (10th Cir. 2005) (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("A state tort cause of action (not predicated on a constitutional violation) is not an
adequate alternative remedy for a constitutional violation."); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note
82, at 20 ("The district court's conclusion that state law tort remedies automatically provide a substi-
tute for Bivens is incorrect .... ).
151. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392
(1971).
152. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-95.
153. Id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1112 (Ebel, J., dissenting)
(arguing that under the majority's approach, a private-prison employee's liability will "depend on
the varying contours of state law").
154. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 24 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., con-
curring)).
155. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
156. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24; accord Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1109 (Ebel, J., dissenting) ("If the
presence of a tort claim against individual officers was not sufficient to preclude a Bivens remedy
against those officers in Carlson, so too should the availability of state-law tort claims against the
instant defendants here be an insufficient substitute for the constitutional cause of action Bivens
provides.").
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Furthermore, state law tort claims are, by definition, related to state
tort law. They do not implicate federal constitutional law. Without a
Bivens cause of action, Mr. Peoples would be completely unable to bring
a claim for the violation of one of his most fundamental rights, freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment. 57 In addition, this difficulty is mul-
tiplied by the realities of our federal prison system. In many cases, state
law remedies will be unable to provide a remedy for constitutional viola-
tions because most federal prisoners are transferred frequently and have
limited access to lawyers. 158  This makes it very difficult for them to
bring state law tort actions for a state in which they are no longer impris-
oned.
Thus, Supreme Court precedent, the inherent inconsistency of state
law, and the realities of our federal prison system virtually guarantee that
state law remedies provide incomplete protection for inmate rights. As a
consequence, the existence of a state law cause of action should not be a
dispositive factor in determining whether a Bivens cause of action for
damages against officers in private prisons should be allowed. Indeed,
"[c]onstitutional rights cannot be adequately safeguarded by a patchwork
of state tort law ... ,, 159
B. The Tenth Circuit's Reliance on Malesko is Unwarranted
In Peoples, the Tenth Circuit based its holding on an incomplete
consideration of Malesko, which held "that the purpose of Bivens is only
to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual
officers .... 6 0  In the end, the Court held that Bivens actions could not
be maintained against private corporations. However, it is important to
note that both parties in Malesko had assumed that a Bivens cause of
action could be brought against the individual officers of a private corpo-
ration.' 61 In fact, this assumption formed the basis for the Court's ration-
ale for holding that the company that employed those officers could not
be sued. The Court stated that if it held that the corporation could be
sued, "claimants will focus their [attention] on it, and not the individual
157. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 20-21; see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("[l1t is true that a state-law tort remedy could be brought against the individual prison
guards as to one of the claims, but perhaps not as to the other two claims which involve different
conduct ... ").
158. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 21 n.5. See also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1112 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("Non-uniform rules of liability . . . do little to protect constitutional rights and may
undermine the settled expectations of prisoners and prison guards, who may be transferred among
different privately-run federal prison facilities located in different states.").
159. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 22.
160. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1101 (majority opinion) (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 70 (2001)).
161. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 14 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 13, Malesko, 534
U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860) and Brief for Respondent at 8, 12, Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No.
00-860)); see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1110 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court in Malesko
"clearly assumed the availability of a [Bivens] remedy against the employees of [the] prison.").
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directly responsible for the alleged injury."' 162 Furthermore, Justice Ste-
vens, in his dissent, stated that "the reasoning of the [majority] opinion
relies, at least in part, on the availability of a remedy against employees
of private prisons."' 163 In other words, the precedent heavily relied upon
by the Tenth Circuit in Peoples actually assumed the opposite position,
that officers in private corporations could be sued for damages under a
Bivens claim. Thus, the Tenth Circuit's reading of Malesko is limited at
best, and ignores a fundamental assumption upon which the Court based
its holding. Instead, the Tenth Circuit based its holding on peripheral
language that clearly was not intended to be construed in a way that pre-
vented inmates from bringing Bivens claims against individual officers in
private prisons.' 64 This is especially true given that both parties and the
Court assumed that this was permissible.
65
C. Officers in Private Prisons Are Government Actors
In holding that a prisoner could bring a Bivens claim against officers
of a private prison, the Sarro court recognized that the power to incarcer-
ate people "whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive preroga-
tive of the state. This is a truly unique function and has been tradition-
ally and exclusively reserved to the state... [this] function is not altered
[if] the government contract[s] to have criminal defendants incarcerated
at privately operated institutions.' 66 These guards serve the exact same
function as their federal counterparts. They exercise the same uniquely
governmental authority of depriving citizens of their right to liberty.
1 67
Principles of symmetry and consistency demand equal treatment of fed-
erally-run and privately-run prisons.1
68
In addition, the D.C. district court has historically viewed CCA as a
government actor when it is under contract with state governments or the
District of Columbia. 169 Moreover, CCA's officers have been sued for
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, and in those
cases CCA never argued that their officers were not government ac-
162. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at
26.
163. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 79 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Appellant, supra
note 82, at 26-27.
164. The Tenth Circuit based its holding on the phrase "otherwise nonexistent cause of action"
in Malesko. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1101 (majority opinion) (citing Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70). How-
ever, given that state law causes of action provide incomplete remedies for federal rights, a remedy
for a constitutional violation is "otherwise nonexistent."
165. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
166. Sarro v. Cornell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 61 (D.R.I. 2003) (citation omitted); see
also United States v. Thomas, 240 F.3d 445, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a guard at a private
prison was a public official for the purposes of a federal bribery statute).
167. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 12.
168. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1110-11 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion as
undercutting "the important policy objective of promoting public-private symmetry" of liability).
169. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 13.
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tors. 17  In fact, in one of its Supreme Court briefs, CCA even admitted
that its employees were acting under color of state law.171 Thus, it is
difficult to imagine why CCA would be a government actor in a state law
scenario and not in a federal scenario. In fact, this situation is even more
difficult to imagine if it is followed to its logical conclusion. If Bivens
claims are not allowed against officers at private prisons, then causes of
action for federal constitutional violations will be allowed when the
prison contracts with a state government and will not be allowed when
the prison contracts with the federal government.
1 72
D. Bivens' Central Goal of Deterrence is Severely Limited
As stated in Malesko, "Bivens from its inception has been based...
on the deterrence of individual officers who commit unconstitutional
acts.' 7 3 Essentially, the purpose of Bivens is to prevent those exercising
government authority from committing constitutional violations. 74 For
example, in Carlson, the Court stated that "because the Bivens remedy is
recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the
FTCA remedy against the government.' 75 If Bivens' central goal is to
deter individual officers, there is no reason why officers in privately-run
prisons who are acting under color of federal law should be allowed to
commit constitutional violations without the threat of a Bivens claim. 1
76
Deterring officers in privately-run prisons from committing constitu-
tional violations is just as important as deterring officers in federal insti-
tutions.
In fact, it could be argued that deterring constitutional violations is
even more vital in privately-run prisons. On average, private prisons
have a staff-to-prisoner ratio 15% below public prisons.' 77 This higher
frequency of unsupervised prisoners might very well lead to a higher rate
170. Id. See generally Beaudry v. Corrections Corp. of America, 331 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir.
2003). See supra note 10 for a discussion of § 1983 litigation.
171. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 13-14 (citing Brief of Petitioners at 19, Richardson
v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (No. 96-318)).
172. Brief of Appellant, supra note 82 at 14 (describing this situation as "untenable") (citation
omitted).
173. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71; see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) ( "[T]he
purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer.").
174. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 15; see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) (stating that individual deterrence is the "primary goal of a Bivens remedy").
175. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21. The Court also stated that "[i]t is almost axiomatic that the threat
of damages has a deterrent effect, surely particularly so when the individual official faces personal
financial liability." Id.
176. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 16; see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("[S]tate-law claim[s] may be more limited than would be a Bivens action. Accordingly,
any deterrent value provided by individualized tort suits against private prison guards is significantly
undercut.").
177. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 18 (citing JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN NCJ 181249, EMERGING
ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 52 (2001)).
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of dangerous occurrences at these private prisons. 178 In addition, in order
to maximize profits, private prisons accept more violent prisoners than
their federal counterparts. 179 These factors translate to a higher risk of
frequent, violent occurrences that will necessarily require guard and in-
mate conflicts. A Bivens cause of action is needed in these situations
because of this higher potential for 'constitutional violations and in no
event should the standard be lower for officers in privately-run institu-
tions.
E. Not Allowing Bivens Claims for Officers in Private Prisons Will Pro-
duce Anomalous Results
If Bivens claims are not allowed against officers at private prisons,
inconsistent situations will result. For example, guards at privately-run
prisons under contract with state governments are liable for constitu-
tional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.180 However, if Bivens claims
are not allowed against employees of private prisons under contract with
the federal government, then state officers will be subject to greater li-
ability than federal officers in the area of constitutional violations.
81
Clearly, not only is this unfair to victims at federally-contracted prisons,
but also this is at odds with the idea of federalism.' 82 This result is even
more bizarre in specific reference to CCA, which contracts with both
state and federal governments. 83 To hold the same officers liable for
constitutional violations only according to their employer's contract is
strange at best, and at worst, patently affects the substantive constitu-
tional rights of inmates.
In addition to the inconsistency that varies according to state and
federal contracts, there is an anomaly between the liability of federal
officers and private officers.' 84 Simply stated, Bivens allows for an in-
mate to bring a claim for constitutional violations against a federal offi-
cer. However, in the Tenth Circuit, if a federal officer happens to be
employed by a government contractor, that inmate has no remedy for
constitutional violations. This inconsistency has no basis. Furthermore,
in Malesko, the Court held that an important reason why prisoners could
not sue private entities was that their federal counterparts were immune
178. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 18.
179. See id. (citing Daniel Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison
Management, 29 NEw ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 33 n.201 (2003)).
180. See supra note 10 for a discussion of § 1983 litigation.
181. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 29; see also Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1111 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court ... has recognized sound jurisprudential reasons for parallelism [between
state and federal actor liability], as different standards for claims against state and federal actors
would be incongruous and confusing.").
182. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 30 (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22 ("The
'constitutional design' would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the same
liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional transgression.")).
183. Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 30.
184. See Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1111 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (describing this as "public-private
symmetry"); see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 31-32.
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from suit.' 85 Specifically, the Court argued that "no federal prisoners
enjoy" the right to sue the organization that incarcerates them.186 There
is no reason for this symmetry to be disrupted when determining the li-
ability of individual officers. Indeed, this may very well result in the
federal government choosing to increase the number of prisoners held by
private prisons because of the limited liability of officers employed pri-
vately.'87
F. If the Courts Don't Do It ....
The majority opinion in Peoples acknowledges and even agrees
with the dissent's assertions that "there are certainly significant policy
arguments that favor extending Bivens to the case at hand . . . .In our
view, however, extending this judicially created remedy so that it more
closely mirrors a statutory remedy is a decision best left for Congress. 188
However, it seems highly unlikely that Congress as an elected body will
ever want to answer to constituents about legislation that extends pris-
oner rights. The courts have historically played a role in the American
system to safeguard of the rights of citizens that may not be able to pro-
tect themselves. However, because the majority agrees that there are
significant reasons to allow a Bivens claim but then does nothing, it is
certain that these policies will go unfulfilled.
CONCLUSION
Given the ever-increasing number of private prisons, the question of
whether prisoners may sue employees of those prisons is one that will
continue to plague our courts. Moreover, the important constitutional
implications have led to strong opinions on both sides of the issue. The
Supreme Court's inconsistent jurisprudence on the issue has led to con-
fusion and that confusion will continue to create a division among the
circuit courts on the issue. This will eventually lead to some circuits
allowing Bivens claims for constitutional violations and some not. Be-
cause a scenario where prisoners will only be allowed to sue for constitu-
tional violations based on where they are being held is untenable, the
Supreme Court will need to determine whether a Bivens claim may be
brought against employees of private prison corporations.
On a more local level, in Peoples, the Tenth Circuit severely limited
the rights of inmates. This decision has far-reaching constitutional im-
plications. Unfortunately, given Bivens and its progeny's ultimate goal,
deterrence, these implications were not intended by the Supreme Court.
In fact, the case relied on most heavily by the Tenth Circuit, Malesko,
actually supports the conclusion that Bivens claims should be allowed
185. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 31-32.
186. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72.
187. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 30.
188. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1103 (majority opinion).
2007]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
against officers in private prisons. In addition, the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion will produce anomalous results because not only will employees of
state-run prisons be subject to greater liability for constitutional viola-
tions than their federal counterparts, but also employees of federal pris-
ons will be subject to greater liability than employees of federally-
contracted private prisons. Finally, instead of safeguarding the rights of
those without the power to do so, the Tenth Circuit urged Congress, a
political body, to pass legislation. Given these powerful reasons for al-
lowing Bivens claims against officers at private prisons, combined with
the majority's hesitation in not allowing these claims, it is likely that this
decision will be revisited many times in the future
Erik Lemmon*
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Kaplan and Professor Moffat for their assistance in preparing this comment and my wife,
Laura, for her tireless support.
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